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DEPARTMENT OF RESEARCH 

THE INFANTRY SCHOOL 

CAMP BENNING, GA. 



COURSE 



IN 



HISTORICAL RESEARCH 

1920-1921 






BATTLE 



OF 



BLADENSBURG 





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BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 

{Narrative by Lt. Col. R. 1. Rees, Inf.) 

The Allied Powers entered Paris, March 31, 1814. 

Napoleon abdicated the throne of l''rance, April 4th. and the treaty 
of peace was signed April 11th. Peace in Europe immediately'- released 
the British military and naval forces from that spheie of operations and 
rendered them available for service elsewhere. War with the United 
States still continued, and pessimistic letters from our peace commission- 
eers in London indicated a reluctance on the part of Great Britain to con- 
sider terms of peace, but rather to prosecute the war with greater vigor, 
and events proved this to be true. 

The war in Europe was hardly at an end v/hen the British govern- 
ment made arrangements to send four brigades from Wellington's army 
to America; three of them to Canada, and one as an expeditionary force 
against coasts of the United States under command of Maj. Gen, Robert 
Ross. The mission of this force, according to the chancellor of the ex- 
chequer (in a speech after the event in the House of Commons, November 
14, 1814.) was "to retaliate upon the Americans for the outrages which 
they had committed upon the frontiers." 

The command of General Ross sailed from the mouth of the river 
Garonne in France, June, 2, 1814, escorted by "a squadron of eleven ship^ 
of war with several store ships and transports," and reached Bermuda, 
July 24th. The expedition was here reinforced by the 21st Regiment and 
sailed for the American coast August 3rd, sighting land August 14th 
and coming to anchor off the mouth of the Potomac on tht; r^th. 1 

On this date General Ross issued a division order, organizing iixc . ^^n- 
mand: 1st Brigade- 4th, or King's Own and 44th Regiments, Colonel 
Brooke, Commanding; 2nd Brigade, 21st Royal Scotts Fusiliers, 2nd Bat- 
talion Royal Marines and Detachment Marines under Captain Robbins, 
Colonel Patterson commanding; and the Light Brigade — 85th Regiment, 
4th, 21st 44th Light Infantry Companies. One company of Marines,, 
the Colonial Marines, and a detachment of artillery 2 3-pounders, one six, 
Colonel Thornton commanding. 2 

In strength this command did not exceed 4500 men. 3 

In arriving at a decision as to his future operations, Ross had the in- 

\aluable counsel and advice of Rear-Admiral Sir George Cockburn, who 

with his naval force had been operating for months previously alon.g the 

coast of J.Iaryland and Virginia. There is no doubt that the feasibility 

1. Gleig-, 42, 69, 89. 

2. Spectator 22. 

3. Gleig 95. 



CATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



of an alUuk o;i Washington v/as discussed at this time, but a decision 
upon that point was permitted to rest upon the course of events. 4 

The American flotilla under command of Connnodore Joshua Barney 
liad given considerable annoyance, and at times had shown stout resist- 
ance to the operations of the British Navy in the Chesapeake and the 
rivers flowing into it. This flotilla had now withdrawn up the Patuxent. 
It was therefore determined to make the destruction of this flotilla the 
primary mission, Ross's command to cooperate by land with Cockburn's 
advance up the river. With this end in view the expedition proceeded 
up the Patuxent to the head of navigation for large ships, abreast Bene- 
dict, reachin:? that place August IDth, and effecting a landing on the 20th. 
Admiral Cochrane sent out two smaller naval expeditions, one under Cap- 
tain Gordon up the Potomac to bombard Fort Washington, the other, 
under Captain Sir Peter Parker, up the Chesapeake above Baltimore, to 
divert the attention of the enemy in that quarter. 5 

Although British Naval depredations along the coast of Maryland 
and Virginia began in February, -1813, little v^^as done by the National 
Government to resist these operations, the only effective force used for 
this purpose being Barney's flotilla. Dependence v/as placed almost 
entirely upon the local militia called out by the local authorities or by the 
states concerned. 6 

The first definite information of the stupendous change in conditions 
in Europe brought about by the dov/nfall of Napoleon, and its possible 
invi^corating efl^ect upon the British campaign against the United States 
reached War-hington JMay 9, 1814, and was constantly being confirmed 
in later dispatches. 7 

The government, and particularly the War Department, treated the 
threatening aspect of affairs with great apathy, and it was not until 
authoritative dispatches v:e.rc recei\-ed by the President on June 26tli 
from the peace commissioners (Gallatin and Bayard) in Europe that 
the govern^:7€i.t v/as stirred to action. On July 1st President Madison 

" meeting of the cabinet to consider measures of defense. As an 

outcome of this meeting, on July 2d the 10th Military District was cre- 
ated, consisting of the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and 
that part of Virginia lying between the Rappahannock and Potomac riv- 
ers, and Brigadier General William H. Winder of the United States 
Army was assigned to command. July 4th the President invited "the 
C'::ecutives of certain States to organize and hold in readiness for innne- 
diate service, a corps of ninety-three thousand five hundred men," the 
quota of Maryland being 6000, Virginia 12,000, Pennsylvania 14,000. 8 
Upon receipt of his order General Winder immediately took active 
conm and, and if his activities were, perhaps in part, wrongly directed, 



•1 1 . 



CorkKurn io Cochrane, 17 Jul. 14, M. SS. L. C. 
5. lU'ports of Ross, Cochrane, Cockburn, Brennan, 137, Glcig 88-96. 
r,. Nut. Int. M;ir. 17, 1811; Nile.s Kegistcr VI, 45. 

Pahncr II, P. 8G. .lames VI, 224. 
7. Nat. Int. May 9, 1814. Ibid May 18, June 30, July 1, 1814. 
S. Slate 1 apers, Military Affairs I, 549. 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG '^ 

th>"»y were no less ardent and strenuous- In his letter of July Cth to 
General Armstrong, Secretary oi War, he makes a good estimate of the 
situation, particularly inviting the attention of the Secretary to the im- 
possibility of assembling in time a militia not already called out and 
organized, should the enemy suddenly advance against Annapolis, Balti- 
more, or Washington, and recommending that a force of four thousand 
be immediately placed at his disposal. Armstrong did not reply to this 
letter. 9 

The Secretary of War July 12th authorized General Winder, in case 
of actual or menaced invasion of the 10th District, to call "for a part, or 
for the whole of the quota (6000) assigned to the state of Maryland, 
which shall have been organized and equipped under the afonssaid requi- 
sition. In performing this duty, you v/ill be careful to avoid unnecessary 
calls and to proportion the call to the exigency." Later under date of 
the 18th Winder was authorized to draw under the same conditions from 
the quota of Virginia 2000 men, and from that of Pennsylvania 5000. 
The whole of the militia of the District of Columbia, amounting to about 
2000, was also placed subject to his orders. 10 

Here was a paper strength of 15,000 militia, but subject to call onlv 
in case of actual or menaced invasion. 

It is not within the limits of this paper to consider, the mass of 
correspondence between General Winder and the Secretary of War, the 
governors of the States of Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania and the 
several commanders of militia, oi' the confusion, obstacles and vexatious 
delays which attended upon his endeavor to organize a dependable force 
for the defense of his district. Suffice it to state that despite his most 
strenuous efforts, he was able to march to the field of Bladensburg riot 
one militiaman from Pennsylvania, not one from Virginia, only one-third 
of the quota from Maryland, not the full quota even from the District 
of Columbia, 11 

On the 17th of August, the day the British appeared off the mouth 
of the Potomac, General Winder had under his direct command a de- 
tachment of the 36th and 38th Regular Infantry, numbering 330 men, 
under command of Lieutenant Colonel Scott, a militia force of 250 men 
under Major Kramer at Bladensburg and the artillery garrisons at Forts 
Washington, McHenry, Severn and Madison, numbering in total 262. 12 

It was therefore now necessary, the condition of actual invasion 
existing, to mobilize and concentrate the militia; and immediately upon 
'Receipt of the information on. the 18th of the appearance of a greatly 
reinforced enemy, in the Chesapeake, orders v/ere expiesscd to the gov- 
ernors and the several commanders of militia. 13 

T\vi lesulting movements were: 

General T. E. Stansbury's Brigade, numbering 1353, composed of 



9. State Papers, Military Affairs, I, 543. 

10. Published in Ingraham p. 12. 
State Papers. Mil. Affairs, 549. 

11. State Papers. Mil. Affairs I. 524 et seq. 

12. State Papers. Mil. I. 554. 

13. Winder's Court. M. S. S. J. A. G. 0. 



4 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG ^ 

the 1st Regiment under Lt. Colonel Rr.gan, and the 2d Regiment, under 
Lt. Colonel Shutz, left Baltimore August 20th and reached Bladensburg 
on the evening of the 22d. 14 

Colonel Joseph Sterrett's 5th Regiment, numbering 500, to which 
were attached jNIajor William Pinkney's Rifle Battalion, 150; and two com- 
panies of artillery under Captains Myer and Magruder, with six six- 
pounders* and 150 men, marched from Baltimore August 21st and arrived 
at Bladensburg about sunset on the 23d. 15 

Colonel \Vm. D. Beall's Annapolis Regiment (Col Hood attached) 
800 strong, reached Bladensburg on the 24th and marched through the 
village not half an hour before the arrival of the British. IG 

The several detachments of militia or volunteer cavalry, Lieut. Col. 
Tilghman, Senior, amounted to about 260 troopers. Two troops of U. S. 
Light Dragoons, 125 men, under Lieut. Col. J. La vail, just organized of 
recruits mounted on horses, most of v/hich were purchased two weeks 
befci-e. reported at Washington August 20th. 17 

The 1st Columbian Brigade, Brig. General W. Smith, commanding, 
composed of two regiments under Cols. Magruder and Brent; two com- 
panies artillery, twelve six-pounders, and two coiupanies riflemen, arm- 
ed with niutikets, under IMajor Peter, totalling 1,070 men, was ordered 
out on tho night of the 18th, assembled on the 19th, and. after great 
difficulty in obtaining the necessary equipment, suceeded in taking up 
the rnai-ch o\t'r th(i Eastern Branch bridge late in tho afternoon of 
'the 20th. 18 

These, vvith a .^ir.ar battalion of 150 men under Major Waring of Md. 
Militia, constituted the whole force under General Winder's command at 
the battle of Bladensburg. Commodore Barney, v/ith 500 flotilla men and 
103 marines under Captain Miller cooperated with him on that field. 
Reports in the archives of the War Department give the total American 
forces at Bladensburg, 5401- 

General Young's 2d Columbian Brigade 450 strong was sent on Aug. 
20th to the defense of Fort Washington, and Colonel Minor's Virginia 
regiment was delayed in Washington and did not reach Bladensburg. 19 
The Secretary of State, Colonel Monroe volunteered on the 18th to 
make a reconnaissance of the enemy, and with a Ti^iall detachment of 
District Cavalry started out on the next morning. He furnished Gen- 
eral Winder with almost the only dependable information he received of 
the enemy's march north to Nottingham. He estimated the enemy's 
strength at five to seven thousand. 20 



14. Slan.sbury's Report. State Papers. Mil. AfTairs I. 5G0. 

15. Stcrrctt's & Pinkney's Reports. 
State Papers, Mil. AlFairs. I. 568, 571. 

IC. Peall's and Pinkney's Reports. State Papers. Mil. AfTairs I. 571. 

17. Lavall'K &■ CaldweH's Report. State Paper.s. Mil. AfTairs I. 569, 575. 

IS. Smith's Report. State Pajjcrs. 

Mil. Airairs I. 563. 
I'.t. Youuk'.'; and Minor's Report. 

.St.-itp I'.ipcrs I., 566, 568. 
M. M«nro«'K rej)ort. Wiiidr v's N.ivrjitivf. Stale Pnppr.*;. Mil. AfFaira I, 6U6, i66. 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 5 

On the 20th, Winder sent Col. Tilghman with his squadron of cavalry 
via Woodyard with orders to "harrass, obstruct and impede" the march 
of the enemy. 21 

On Monday morning, the 22d, there were assembled at Woodyard Gen- 
eral Smith's Brigade, Scott's Ilegulars, Lavall's Cavalry, and Kramer's 
Battalion, and General Winder early sent out the detachment of the Reg- 
ular infantry and Major Peter's conimand, with Lavall's cavalry preced- 
ing to make a reconnaissance in force toward Nottin£;ham where the 
British were known to have camped the night bcfoi-e. Winder accompan- 
ied the cavalry, and having proceeded about four miles he perceived the 
British marching by the direct road toward Upper Marlborough. With- 
out attempting to engage the enemy he ordered the withdrawal of the 
whole command to Battalion Old Fields, a point about eight miles from 
Upper Marlborough and the same distance from Washington. About 
noon of this day, Commodore Barney being convinced that his flotilla 
was doomed to capture destroyed it and with Jiis seamen joined General 
Winder's comnu.nd at Battalion Old Fields. Captain Miller with his 
marines had also joined. The next day, the 23d, a similar manoeuver was 
repeated, the advance of a detachment toward the enemy in the direction 
of Upper Marlborough, a meeting, a withdrawal without an engagement 
to Battalion Old Fields with the enemy halted only three miles distant; 
then in the evening a most extraordinary decision on the part of Gen- 
eral Winder, even at variance with his ow^n estimate of the situation, 
caused him to withdraw his whole force into the City of Washington across 
the Eastern Branch Bridge. Thus Vvere the British permitted an unin- 
terrupted and an almost totally unharrassed march of forty-five miles 
into the enemy's country. 22 

General Winder found himself the next morning out of touch with 
the enemy, and the victim of many contradictory rumors as to his move- 
ments. However, about ten o'clock, definite intelligence was received that 
the British were marching on Bladensburg. As soon as he had issued 
the necessary orders placing his command in march, he preceded it in 
haste to Bladensburg. In the meantime General Stansbury, in command 
at Bladensburg, having received information of Winder's retreat 
across the Eastern Branch, and also that the British were advancing on 
Bladensburg, determined to march toward Washington to form a junc- 
tion with General Winder. After having proceeded about a mile and a 
half in that direction he was met by his Adjutant, ]\Iajor Woodyear, 
returning from General Winder with positive orders to give the enemy 
battle at Bladensburg, and that he w^ould be reinforced. General Stans- 
bury at once counter-marched his command, proceeded toward Bladens- 
burg, and selected the ground along the right bank of the Eastern Branch 
just west of Bladensburg for defense. 23. 

The battlefield of Bladensburg is a terrain gradually rising to the 
west from the Eastern Branch terminating one mile distant in a low line 

21. Winder's Court. M. S. S., J. A. G. 0. 

22. Winder's Narrative. Smith's Report. Catlett's Report. 

It3. Stansbury, Sterrett and Pinkney. 
State Ptipers, I, 261-371. 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBIIRG 



of hills perpendicular to the Washing-ton turnpike. The river bank is low 
and marshy back about 800 yards from the river where there is a low 
terrace. The old Washington road foims a junction with the pike near 
the bridge and leads in a westerly direction. About 1100 yards from 
'ihe b)'idge is a broad, deep ravine (the old dueling ground) crossing the 
P'ke perpendicularly. Fi'om the bridge in this i-avine to the line of hills the 
distance is 650 yards- The gi'ound west of the ravine and north of the 
pike is considerably cut up by gullies; to the south it is fairly level. 

In making his dispositions, assisted by the Secretary of State who 
had joined him. General Stansbury placed Myer and Magruder's artillery 
in a trench prepared the day before by Colonel Decius Wadsworth, C. E., 
on the crest of the low terrace, to the north of the pike. Major Pinkney's 
battalion supported the artillery, two companies on the right near the pike, 
and one on the left- He concealed his men behind fences and in the un- 
derbrush. Captain Doughty's company of the Fifth Regiment also sup- 
ported the artillery on the right. 

About 250 yards in rear, with an orchard intervening, vrere disposed 
Colonel Ragan with his right on the road, Colonel Schutz in the center 
and Colonel Sterrett on the left somewhat farthei" advanced and nearer 
the artillery. General Stansbury states that his entire line was later 
moved back 250 yards, by whose authority he does n.ot knov/, presum- 
ably Colonel Monroe's. 24. 

General Winder arrived on the field and approved these disposlt'onc. 
He brought with him Captain Burch's Battery, two guns of which were 
placed on the pike on Ragan's right and three on the old road to Ster- 
rett's loft. Lavall's cavalry was in rear to the left of Sterrett. 

When the column from Washington arrived. General Smith placed 
them in position along the line of hills already mentioned. Commodore 
Darrry v;itr> his two 18 pour.ders occupied the ceriter on tlio pike, the sail- 
ors armed as infantry on his right, the line being farther extended by 
Captain Miller's marines a little more advanced. Colonel Beall with his 
Annapolis militia was already in a position on a hill about 250 yards from 
the road on Barney's right. The left vv^as extended by Colonel Magruder's 
regiment. Major Peter's battery and riflemen, with Colonel Scott's Reg- 
ulars on the extreme left. I'his Aras the final disposition after some 
shifting. Major Kramer's battalion was advanced in fi'ont of the sailors 
to the edge of the ravine. 25 

On the morning of the 23d at llpper Marlborough follov, ing the 
destruction of Barney's flotilla. General J?oss and Rear Admiral Cockburn 
held a conference and it was quickly decided that an attempt should 
be made to capture the city of Washington. Accordingly Ross took up 
the mai'ch on the afternoon of the same day. On the 24th the troops 
resumofl the march and reached Bladensburg. On the opi)Ositc side of 
the Eastern Branch the enemy was discovered and from Lowndes Hill 
Ross reconnoitered his position. Disposition for attack having been 

24. Slanpbury, Pinkncy, Monioc. 

State Iaper.s, I, 361-37]. 
2.".. W. KiiiKh. CoUmol Dcall. 

SlJitc rajjor.v, Milit.uy AffuiiH, I., (ICO'. 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 7 

made, it was commenced with much impetuosity by the Liji'ht r*)-igade, 
under Colonel Thornton. The first lino was soon carried, the enemy 
retiring to higher ground. The Light Brigade being unable to carry the 
second line, it was reinforced by the 1st Brigade, under Colonel Brooke, 
the 44th attacking the enemy's left, the 4th pressing his right the v.hoie 
line soon gave Nsay, and the Americans lied. This is the Hi'itish ac- 
count. 26 

On the American side, the artillery with Pinkney's battalion in 
support, received the brunt of the first assault. The British were forced 
off the streets of Bladensburg to cover of the buildings, and were consid- 
erably delayed in crossing the river. Major Pinkney was soon forced 
back, withdrev/ to the left and formed again on Colonel Sterreit's leit. 
The regiment of Colun<;ls Ragan and Schutz were quickly driven back, the 
untrained militia being unable ^"O withstand the discharge of the Con- 
greve rockets used by the British. Colonel Sterrett maintained his 
position until his right fiank, now exposed, was completely turned arid 
his left threatened, and only withdrew when ordered to do so by General 
Winder. Lavall's regular cavalry retreated in the melee without being of 
any service. This whole force was completely demoralized, and the^r 
retreat became a rout. I^'ortunately their line of retreat led them north 
and clear of the second line. 

The B];itish attack developed entirely on the right of this lir^e, south 
of the road. Major Kramer's battalion on the crest of the ravine wao 
soon forced to withdiaw, but eveiy attempt the enemy made to advance 
from the ravine against Barney and Miller's front was repulsed with 
heavy loss. Major Peter with his artillery on the left rendered consici- 
erable assistance with his cross fire in the early stages of this action. 
Being reenforced and working around to their left the British assaulted 
ihe hill occupied by the Annapolis troops under Colonel Beall, who, aitei' 
firing three or four rounds, retreated in disorder. Barney's right was 
n-iw flanked by the enemy. This being observed by General \\ indor, lie 
ordered a general retreat which was executed in good order by the troop.i 
that remained. General Smith's District Militia and Colonel Scott's ii'e-j- 
ular Detachment were not engaged. Commodoie Barney was severely 
v.'ounded and was taken prisoner. What remained of General Winders 
command retreated through the city to the heights of Georgetown, and 
later to Montgomery Courthouse. 27 

The British did not pursue. After a halt upon the battlefield, the 
march was resumed and the command reached the outskirts of W'ashin^;- 
ton about 8 :00 p. m. Ross and Cockburn entered the city with about 2v>0 
men and the work of destruction began. The Capitol, ihe W hite House, 
and the public offices. Treasury, State, War and Navy and Public Library 
were burned ; a rope walk and long bridge over the Potomac destroyed ; 
the printing establishment of the National Intelligence wrecked; the 
destruction of the Navy Yard was made complete. The total public loss 



26. Ross' and Cockburii's reports. 
Palmer IV, 342, Gleig, 3 22. 

27. Ross's report.. 

Palmer IV, 148, Military Afiairs I. 



8 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 

was $969,1'71.04. The British hastily retreated from Washin<?ton on the 
night of the 25th and reached Benedict on the 29th. 28 

The British loss at the battle of Bladensburg was G4 ofTicers and 
men killed, and 185 oflicers and men wounded, the total casualties 249, a 
casualty percentage of 5'/2- The heaviest losses were in the 85ih and the 
4th, '^oth o[ wJiiei: regiments were in Barney's front. The 85th also made 
the first advance. 

The American losses were, according to i-eports in the archives of 
the War Department, 25 ofiicers and men killed, and 41 ofilccrs and men 
wounded, total C6, giving a casualty percentage oi 1.2. Ihe heaviest 
losses v.ere .sustained by Captain Miller's detachment of Marine-:;, ColGiiel 
Sterrett's Regiment and Connncdore Barney's Lcamcn. Captain Miller 
lost 21 per cent of his force. 

In frontages, our first line was occupied by about 5 men per yard 
and the second line by 3 men per yard; seemingly suuicient for defense 
against an inferior force. 

The cause for this disaster and the failure of the American arms 
are not far to seek. 

Many in authority at Washington did not think it possible that the 
British would have the temerity to advance so far inland as to attack the 
capitol, when Annapolis and Baltimore were so much more accessible. 
Chief among these v/as the Secretary of War himself, which may account 
in part for the half hearted support he gave to General Whider. 

At any rate, there was a notable lack of organization and trainin:^ 
in the force hurriedly assembled on the field of Eladen^-burg. It was 
little more than a mob. General W^inder felt keenly the necessity of at- 
taining these two great factors for military success, but v/as again met 
v.'ith the opinion of General Armstrong ''that the most advantageous 
mode of using militia was upon the spur of the occasion, and to bring them 
to fight as soon as called." 

The dilatory policy of the government caused to exist a great short- 
age of transportation, munitions, rations and supplies of eveiy kind, re- 
sulting in delay in assemblirig and in unnecessary hardship and suffering 
for the troops. 

In leadership General Winder, 30 years of age, was a lavryer in Bal- 
timore until he was appointed a Lieutenant Colonel in the Regular Army 
in July, 1812. He was appointed Brigadier General in March, 1813, v/as 
captured by the British on the northern frontier June 1, 1813, and re- 
mained a pri.'^oi^ei- on parole until he took connnand of the 10th military 
district, lie could not hope to have the military attainments of his op- 
ponent, General Ross, 48 years of age, 25 years a Britidi ofiicer aiid 
accustomed to large commands. 

A discussion or comparison of the quality of troops is needless; 
Wellington's veterans; a;raiiist raw militia. 

The dispositions at Bladensburg were taken up hurriedly and with- 
out coordination. The linos v/ere formed not within supporting distance, 
the effective range of the nmskct at that time being not more than 200 



28. Koss' report. 

J'aln.er IV, !4S, Military AHYiirs I. 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



yiirds. This permitted the enemy to defeat each line in detail. The 
successive line formation is not for unti-ained troops in the open. 

'ine timid tactical policy of General Winder was doomed to failure. 

.e should have prepared defenses for the near approaches to the city. 

^ should have moved with all his available force to p:ain quick contact 

•: 'th the enemy, being reinforced as other troops assembled. Had he 

maintained close contact with the enemy, fought delaying actions, deter- 

n^inod. using his own words to Col. Tilghman to "obstruct, harass, impede 

liim in every way your resource and ingenuity can suggest," he m;.' l; 

!,ave achieved success. 

If after all his efforts he had still been forced to meet the enemy on 
Lhe field of Bladensburg and suffer defeat, he should r.ot have fled through 
tae streets of Washington to the heights of Georgeto^^ n, but should have 
contested every foot of ground from that field to the very doors of the 
capitol. 



STATEMENT OF GENERAL WINDER TO INVESTIGATION IN 
THE INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. 

As cson as I learned the enemy were moving toward Bladensburg. I 
ordered General Smith, with the whole of the troops, to move immedi- 
ately to that point. 

Hs :|: * * =;: 

I arrived at the bridge at Bladensburg about twelve o'clock, where I 
found Lieutenant-Colonel Beall had that moment passed with his com- 
mand, having just arrived from Annapolis. I had passed the line of 
Stansbury's brigade, formed in the field upon the left of the road, at 
about a quarter of a mile in the rear of the bridge; and on the road, a' 
short distance in the rear of Stansbury's line, I met several gentlemen, 
md among the others, I think, Mr. Francis Key, of Georgetovrn, ^vho in- 
ormed me that he had thought that the troops coming from the city 
could be most advantageously posied on the rignt and left of the 
near that point. General Smith being present, Mr. Key undertook, I 
believe, being sent for that purpose, to show the positions proposed. 1 
left General Smith to make a disposition of these troops, and procedod 
to the bridge, where I found Lieutenant-Colonel Beall, as before stated. 
I inquired whether he had any directions as to his position; he replied 
he had been shown a high hill upon the right of the road, ranging v/ifh 
the p]-oposed second line. It being a commanding position, and necessary 
to be occupied by some corps, I directed him to proceed agreeably to th? 
instructions he had received. I then rode up to a battery which h.\c' 
■jeen thrown up to command the street which entered Bladensburg frori 
the side of the enemy and the bridge, where I found the Baltimore artil- 
lery posted, with the Baltimore riflemen to support them. ITpon inquiry, 
I leanv.^d that General Stansbury was on a rising ground upon the left 
of his line. I rode immediately thither, and found him and Colonel Mon- 
oe together. The latter gentleman informed me that he had been aiding 
General Stansbury to post his command, and wished me to proceed to 



10 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 

examine it with them, to see how far 1 approved of it. We were just 
proceeding- with this view, when some perwon rode up and stated that 
the news had just been received of a signal victory obtained by Gener- 
al Izard over the en^iy, in which one thou:;and of the enemy were 
slain, and many prisoners taken. 1 ordered the news to be immedi- 
ately coinmunicated to the troops, for the pui'pose of giving additional 
impulse to their spirit and courage. The column of the enemy at this 
moment appeared in sight, moving up the Eastern branch parallel to 
our position. From the left, where I was, I perceived that if the position 
of the advanced artillery were forced, two or three pieces upon the left 
of Stansbury would be necessary to scour an orchard which lay betvv^een 
liis line and his artillery, and for another rifle company to increase the 
support of this artillery. 

These were promptly sent forward by General Smith, and posted as 
hastily as possible, and it was barely accomplished before I was obliged 
to give orders to the advanced artillery to open upon the enemy, who was 
descending the street toward the bridge. All farther examination or 
moven-'cnt was now impossible, and the position where I then was, im- 
mediately in the rear of the left of Stan.sbury's line, being the most ad- 
vanced position from which I could have any commanding view, 1 
remained there. The fire of our advanced artillery occasioned the enemy, 
svho were advancing, and who w^ere light troops, to leave the street, and 
they crept down under the cover of houses and trees, in loose order, so 
as not to expose them to risk from the shot; it was therefore only occa- 
i^-ionally that an object presented at which the artillery could fire. 

In this sort of suspension, the enemy began to throw his rockets, and 
his light troops began to accumulate down in the lower parts of the town 
and near the bridge, but principally covered from view by the houses, 
'iheir light troops, however, soon began to issue out and press across th^ 
creek, which Vv-as everywhere fordable, and in most places lined with 
bushes or trees, which w^ere sufiicient, however, to conceal the move- 
ments of light troops, who act, in the manner of thoiro, singly. Ihe 
advanced rifiemen nov/ begaii to fire, and continued it for half a dozen 
rounds, when I observed them to run back to the skirts of the orchard on 
the left, where they became visible, the boughs of the orchard trees con- 
cealing their original position, as also that of the artillery from view. A 
retreat of twenty or thirty yards from their original position toward 
the left broiifht thorn in view on the edge of the orchard. They halted 
thei'e, and seemed for a moment returning to their position, but in a few 
minutes entirely broke, and retired to the left of Stansbury 's line. 1 
immediately ordered the 5th Baltimore regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sterrett, being the left of StanoLury's line, to advance and sustain the 
artillei'y. They promptly commenced this movement; but the rockets, 
which had for the first three or four passed very high above the heads 
of the line, now icceived a more horizontal direction, and passed very 
close above th' lieads of Shutz's and Ragan's i-egiments, composing the 
centre and left oi" Stcusbury's line. A universal llight of these regiments 
was the consequence. This leaving the right of the 5th Vvhoily uiisup- 
ported. 1 ordered it to halt, rode swil^tly across the field toward those 
who had so shamefully lied, and exerted mj' voice to the utmost to arrest 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBITRC, 11 



them. They halted, began to collect and seemed to be returning to their plac- 
es. An ill-founded reliance that their oflicers would succeed in rallying them 
when 1 had thus succeeded in stopping the greatest part of them, induced 
ine immediately to return to the 5th, the situation of which was likely 
to became very critical, and that position gave me the best command of 
view. To my astonishment and moi'tification, however, when I had i:c- 
gained my position, 1 found the whole of these regiments (except thii-ty 
01- forty of Ragan's rallied by himself, and as many, pcj-haps, of Shutz's, 

rallied, I learn, by Captain Shower and Captain , whose name I do 

not recollect) were flying in the utmost precipitation and disorder. 

The advance artillery had immediately followed the riflemen, and 
retired by the left of the 5th. I directed them to take post on a rising 
ground which I pointed out in the rear. The 5th, and the artillery on its 
left, still remained, and I hoped that their fire, notvvithstanding the ob- 
struction of the boughs of the orchard, which, being below, covered the 
enemy, would have been enabled to scour this approach and prevent his 
advance. The enemy's light troops, by single men, showed themselves on 
the lo^ver edge of the left of the orchard, and received the fire of this 
artillery and the 5th, which made them draw back. The cover to them 
was, however, so complete that they were enabled to r.dvance singly and 
talvo positions from which their fire annoyed the 5th considerably, with- 
out either that regiment or the artillei-y being able to return the fire with 
any probability of eflect. In this situation 1 had actually given an order 
to the 5th and the artillery to retire up to the hill, toward a wood more 
to the left and a little in the rear, for the purpose of drawing them far- 
ther from the orchard, and out of reach of the enemy's fire while he was 
sheltered by the orchard. As aversion, however, to retire before the 
necessity became stronger, and the hope that the enemy would issue in a 
body from- the left of the orchard and enable us to act upon him on terms 
..f equality, and the fear that a movem.ent of retreat might in raw troops 
px'oduce some confusion and lose us this chance, induced me instantly to 
countermand the order, and direct the artillery to fire into a wooden barn 
on the lower end of the orchard, behind which I supposed the enemy 
might be sheltered in considerable numbers. The fire of the enemy now 
began, hov\^ever, to annoy the 5th still more in wounding several of them, 
and a strong column of the enemy having passed up the road as high as 
the right of the 5th, and beginning to deploy into the field to take them 
in flank, I directed the artillery to retire to the hill to which I had directed 
the Baltimore artillery to proceed and halt, and ordered the 8th regiment 
also to retire. This corps, which had heretofore acted so firmly, evinced 
the usual incapacity of rav/ troops to make orderly movements in the 
face of the enemy, and their i-ctreat in a very few moments became a 
flight of absolute and total disorder. 

The direct line of retreat to the whole of this first line being to the 
nill on which I had directed the artillery to halt, and immediately in con- 
nection with the positions of General Smitli's corps, which were not ar- 
rayed in line, but posted on advantageous positions in connection with 
and supporting each other, according as the nature of the ground admit- 
1 and required, I had not for a moment, dispersed and disordered as 
as the whole of Stansbury's command, supposed that their i-etreat would 



12 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



.ave taken a different direction. But it soon became apparent that the 

hole mass were throwing themselves off to the right on the retreat 

toward Montgomery Court House, and flying wide of this point; the 

whole of the cavalry, probably from the pressure of the infantry that 

/ay, were also thrown wide of the line of retreat tov.ard the right. 

After making every effort to turn the current more toward General 
Smith's command the city in vain, and finding that it was impossible to 
collect any force to support the artillery, which I had directed to halt, 
md finding also that the enemy's light troops were extending themselves 
in that direction, and pressing the pursuit, 1 directed the artillery to con- 
tinue their retreat on the road they then were toward the Capitol, it 
oeing impossible for them to get across to the turnpike road or unite with 
General Smith's brigade. 

The hope of again forming the first line at this point, and there re- 
newing the retreat, or, at all events, of being able to rally them between 
the Capitol and that point and renewing the contest, induced me, at the 
moment I directed the 5th regiment to retreat, to request Mr. Riggs, of 
Georgetown, to proceed to the President and infoim him that we had 
been driven back, but that it was my hope and intention to form and 
renew the contest between that place and the Capitol. 

As soon as I found it vain longer to endeavor to tui-n the tide of re- 
treat toward the left, I turned toward the pos!t:ons occupied by Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Beall, Commodore Barney, and General Smith. By this tir.T^ 
ilie enemy had advanced up the road, had driven back Lieutenant-Colonel 
Kramer's command, posted on the right of the road, and in advance of 
Commodore Barney, after having well maintained his position and much 
hurt the enemy, and also continued to fire during his retreat. He had 
come under the destructive fire of Commodore Barney, which had turned 
nini up the hill toward Lieutenant-Colonel Beall, whose detachment gave 
one or two ineffective fires and fied. Their position was knovrn to me, 
was very conspicuous, and the extreme right. The enemy, therefore, hac! 
gained this commanding position, and was passing our right flank; hjs 
force pursuing on the left had also advanced to a line with our left, and 
there was nothing there to oppose him. To preserve Smith's command' 
from being pressed in front by fresh troops of the enemy, who were com- 
ing on at the same time, while they were under the certainty of being 
assailed on both flanks and the rear by the enemy, who respectively gained 
them, in which circumstances their destruction or surrender would have 
•icen inevitable, I sent (my horse being unable to move with the rapid1t\- 
1 wished) to General Smith to retreat. I am not acquainted with tho 
i-('lative position of the different corps composing his command, and can 
not, therefore, determine who of them engaged the enemy, nor could I sec 
how tiiey acted; but when I arrived in succession at his different corps, 
which 1 did as soon as practicable, I do not recollect to have found any 
of them that were not in order, and retreating with as little confusion as 
could have been expected. When I reached the road I found Commodore 
Barney's men also retiring on the road, he having been overpowered by 
those who drove off Beall's regiment about the time I sent the order to 

)'etreat. 

* ♦ ♦ ♦ 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 1P> 



I accordingly pursued this course, and halted at Tcnleytown, two 
miles from Goorgetown, on the Frederick road. Here was evinced one 
of the great defects of all undisciplined and unorganized troops; no effort 
could rouse ofTicers and men to the exertion necessary to place themselves 
in such a state of comfort and security as is attainable even under very 
disadvantageous circumstances. Such of them as could be halted, inf.tead 
>f making those efl'orts; gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings 
which fatigue, exhaustion, and privation produced, and pursued their 
way, either toward home, or in search of refreshments and quarters. 
After waiting in this position until I supposed I collected all the force 
that could be gathered, I proceeded about five miles further on the river 
road, which leads a little wide to the left of IMontgomory Court House, 
and in the morning gave orders for the whole to assemble at Montgomery 
Court House. 

If I had had longer time, or to repeat the action of Bladenphurg, 
I could correct several errors, vdiich might materially have affected the 
issue of that battle. The advanced force ought to ha^•e been nearer to the 
creek, along the edge of the low ground, where they would have been skirt- 
ed with bushes, and have avoided the inconvenience of the cover which 
the orchard afforded the enemy. The edge of the low grounds on the right 
of the road ought to have been lined with musketry, and a battery of can- 
non also planted in the field on the right of the road, directly fronting the 
bridge ; and if Commodore Barney's heavy artillery, Mnth his more expert 
artillerists, had occupied the position which the advanced artillerists did, 
and .those posts been obstinately defended, the enemy would not have 
crossed the river at that point, but v/ould haA'e been obliged to have made 
a circuit arouiid to his right, and have crossed above and at the upper end 
of the tov/n ; or, if the whole force had been posted at the position of the 
second line, with all the advantage w^hich it afforded, and had acted v.n'th 
tolerable courage and firmness, the event might have been different: hv.' 
no advantage of position is proof against groundless panic, and a total 
want of discipline, skill, and experience. 



REPORT OF GENERAL STANBURY. 

I immediately ordered the troops to retrace their steps to Bladens- 
.burg, determined to maintain, if possible, the ground at all hazards. 

On arriving in the orchard near the hill, I directed the artillery to 
post themselves behind a small breastv.ork of dirt that lately had been 
thrown up by Colonel Wadsv/orth. This battery commanded the pass into 
Bladensburg and the bridge southwesterly of the town. Our artillery 
consisted of six six-pounders; Major Pinkney's battalion of rifle- 
men on their right, under cover of the town and bushes, also com- 
manding the pass by the bridge; two companies from Lieutenant-Colo- 
nel Shutz's regiment, under the command of Captains Ducker and Gor- 
such, acting as riflemen, although principally armed with muskets, on the 
left of the artillery, near and protected by, the barn, intended to defend 
the road leading by the mill on the left of the battery, into the field ; Colo- 
nel Sterrett's regiment was halted in the orchard, on the right and in the 



14 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 

rear, and the regiments of Colonels Ragan and Shutz were also halted in 
the orchard, in the rear and on the left flank, near the ci'eek. My intentions 
were that they should remain here to refresh themiseh es as long- as pos- 
sible, and, as soon as the enemy appeared, to form Colonel Sterrett's regi- 
ment (in whom I placed great confidence) on the right, their left resting on 
and supporting the right of Major Pinkney's riflemen, in view of the 
bridge and fronting the road, along which ran a fence, and act as occasion 
should require. Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regiments were to be drav/n 
up in echelon, their right resting on the left of Captains Ducker's and Gor- 
such's rifle companies, in order to prevent the enemy from pressing and 
turning our left, hoping that General Winder would join me before the 
battle would commence, and occupy the ground in my rear as a second 
line. About 11 o'clock a. m. I was informed by a dragoon from Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Beall that he was on the road from Annapolis to Bladensburg, 
with about eight hundred men, distant from me about five miles, and 
svished to know the distance and situation of the enemy. I directed the 
dragoon to return and inform him ,that 1 had that moment received in- 
formation that the British, with their whole force, were approaching 
Bladensburg by the river road, and that they were only three and a half 
miles distant, and advised the colonel to file off to his right and cross 
above Bladensburg, to fall into an old road which 1 understood led to our 
left toward Washington, and take a position on the high grounds north 
and northwest of Bladensburg, which would completely protect my left 
by preventing the enemy from outflanking us that way, and force their 
main body across the bridge, in the face of my artillery and riflemen on 
the main road, and expose them to the fire of the 5th regiment under 
Colonel Sterrett, who would be protected by the fence. 

This advice, it appeared. Colonel Beall only took in part, 1 presume 
from an anxious wish to place himself between the enemy and the city. 
He sent his baggage off" to the right, and with his troops passed the bridge 
at Bladensburg about thirty minutes before the enemy appeared on Mr. 
Lowndes' hill, and took his station on the hill, as I was informed, near the 
brick-kiln where we halted in the morning, about one and a half miles in 
my rear, and on the left of the road leading to the city. About meridian 
the enemy could clearly be seen making towai'd us by the rivei- road. 

While I was giving some dii-ections to the artillery, 1 found Lieuten- 
ant-Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regiments had been moved from the 
place where I had stationed them, and marched out of the orchard up the 
hill and formed in order of battle about two hundred and fifty yards 
above the orchai'd. and upward of five hundiod yards in the rear of ilv 
j'.rtill"ry and riflemen. Thus uncovered by the trees of the oichai'd. (heir 
situation and numbers were cleai'ly seen by the enemy from Lowndes' 
Hill, and the flanks of the artillery and i-iflemen unpi'otected and laid lia- 
ble to be turned, our main body being placed tro far off" to ivnder them 
any aid. On riding up the hill to know who had ordered this movement, 
T was infoj-mcd that General Winder was on the ground. At this time I 
met with Brigadier General Smith, of the District of Columbia, and some 
conversation took placo betw( on us I'e.'-pcH-ting the order of battle and 
soniority; the particulars I do not rocollect. I inniK^diatc l.\' rodo to the 
mill, where I undei-stood Genci-al Windei- was, and lound him i-econ- 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 15 



noitering the position of the enemy. While in conversation with him, the 
5th reg-iment was taken out of the orchard, marched up the hill, and sta- 
tioned on the left of Colonel Shutz's i-egiment, that of Colonel Ragan 
being on the right, its right resting on the main road; but, as I before 
observed, the vrhole at so great a distance from the artillery and rifle- 
men that they had to contend with the whole British force, and so much 
exposed that it has been a cause of astonishment they preserved their 
ground so long and ultimately succeeded in retreating. Whose plan this 
was I know not ; it was not mine, nor did it meet v/ith my approbation ; 
but, finding a superior ofilcer on the ground, I concluded he had ordered, 
it, consequently did r:ot interfere. General Winder asked me where I 
meant to take my station. I answered, about the centre of my bi'igade. 
He said he would take his on the left of the 5th i-egiment. General W'inder 
was extremely active on giving directions and encouraging the raen. i 
took my station in the centre of .Colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regimcnf-, 
but occasionally rode along the line, encouraging the m.en and giving 
orders to the officers. Major Woodyear I directed to keep with the le \ 
of Colonel Shutz's regiment, to cheer up the men and assist the officers. 
Major Randall rode vnth me. Scon after, the action commenced by the 
artillery and riflemen at the battery. The fire of the artillery had great 
effect, and evidently produced confusion in the ranks of the enemy, who 
took shelter behind a warehouse, from whence they fired rockets ; but a 
few well-directed shots drove them from this position. A flanking party, 
concealed by the banks and bushes, pushed up the river to turn our I' 
while a strong force attempted the bridge; but the incessant and v.'ell- 
directed fire from our artillery and riflemen at the battery occasioned 
evident confusion among their ranks, so much so that their ofl^'cers con'i 
be seen actively engaged preventing their retreating, and push^ig then 
on to the bridge, and here I think the enemy sufl'ered considerably. At 
length they succeeded in passing the bridge in small parties at full speed, 
which formed after crossing. 1 had ordered foi'ty horsemen with axes to 
cut away this bridge before the near approach of the enemy, and saw 
them with their axes. Why this order was not executed I n.ever covJf^ 
learn. It is certain the enemy could have forded the stream above; but 
I considered it would, in some degree, impede their progress and give our- 
artillery and riflemen more time and opportunity to act v/ith effect against 
them. 

The artillery, under the command of Captains Myer and Magruder, 
and the riflemen, the v/hole under the command of Major Pinkney, be- 
haved in the most gallant manner (this gallant officer in the course of 
the action was severely wounded), but the superior force of the enemy, 
and the rapidity witli which he moved, compelled them to retire; but one 
of the pieces was lost, and this was rendered harmless before it was aban- 
doned. 

The enemy took every advantage of the cover afi'orded them by the 
trees of the orchard, and their light troops from thence kept up a galling 
fire upon our line. On this party, when advanced nearer, the 5th regi- 
ment, under Colonel Sterrett, opened a steady and well-directed fire, which 
Avas followed by the fire from the right, and ultimately from our centre, 
when the firing on both sides became general. After a few rounds, the 



16 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



troops on the right began to break. I rode along the line, and gave orders 
to the officers to cut down those who attempted to fly, and suffer no man 
to leave the lines. On arriving at the left of the centre regiment, I found 
Lieutenant-Colonel Schutz's men giving way, and that brave officer, with 
Major Kemp, aided by my aid-de-camp. Major Woodyear, exerting them- 
selves in rallying and forming them again. Captain Callaway's company 
and part of Captains Shower's and RandalFs companies were rallied and 
formed again, and behaved gallantly. The rest of Colonels Shutz's and 
Ragan's regiments fled in disorder, notwithstanding the extraordinary 
exertions of their officers to prevent it. On the left I soon after discov- 
ered a part of the 5th regiment giving way, and that excellent officer, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Sterrett, with those under him, most actively engaged 
forming them again. Soon after the retreat became general, and all at- 
tempts to rally them, and make a second stand, were fruitless. With a 
body of United States cavalry, I endeavored to protect the rear and right 
of the retreating men, so as to prevent their falling into the enemy's pos- 
session. 

The men under my command were worn down and nearly exhausted 
from long and forced marches, want of food, and watching. They had 
been, with very little intermission, under arms and marching from the 
time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little sleep, bad pro- 
visions, and but little opportunity to cook. They certainly were not in a 
condition to go into battle; but my orders were positive, and I was de- 
termined to obey them. 

j¥ * * * 

On arriving at the city, with part of Colonel Lavall's United States 
Cavalry covering the retreat, and collecting the rear of our scattered 
troops, I found General Winder's command had passed through it toward 
Georgetown. I proceeded there, and then followed to a village a few 
miles beyond it, where I overtook him with troops collecting under his 
command, and some of those of my brigade. The army thence proceeded 
to Montgomery Court House on the 25th of August, where it was hourly 
re-enforced by tho:.e who fled from the field. 

As there had been no place assigned by the commanding general pre- 
vious to the action to which the men should retreat in case of a defeat, 
many of those under my immediate command had fled from the field 
toward Baltimore. 

Reports from Georgetown and the city reached me that the arms of 

many of the enemy had fallen into the hands of the blacks, and it was 

apprehended that they would take advantage of the absence of the men 

to insult the females, and complete the work of destruction commenced 

by the enemy. 

* * * ♦ ^>) 

REPORT OF GENERAL SMITH 

Here, at the Long Old Fiolds, pursuant to directions from Genera' 
Winder, I assumed the command of the assembled forces, those of Com- 
modore Barney excepted, consisting now of the following troops, viz. ; 



18 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



make, I apprised General Stansbury of my views as to the troops under 
my command, suggesting that, if his line should be forced and he coulc! 
again form on my left, the nature of the ground there would be favor- 
able for a renewal of the action, which might then become general. By 
this time we received advice that the enemy were near Bladensburg, and 
I left him to hasten the arrival of my troops. They moved rapidly on, 
notwithstanding the excessive heat of the day, covered with clouds of 
dust, and were promptly disposed of as follows: Lieutenant-Colonel 
Scott, with the 36th U. S. regiment, was posted in a field on the left oi 
the road, his right resting upon it, and commanding the road descending 
into the ravine before mentioned, in the rear of General Stansbury's 
right, and the rest of his line commanding the ascent from the ravine. 
This position was about one hundred and fifty yards in the rear of the 
front line, but extending to the right. In the same field, about one hun- 
dred yards in the rear of the 36th regiment. Colonel Magruder was post- 
ed with a part of the 1st regiment of District Militia, his right also 
resting upon the road, the left advanced, presenting a front obliquely to 
the road, and situated to cover and cooperate with the 36th regiment; 
Major Peter, with his artillery, six six-pounders; Captain Davidson's 
light infantry, and Captain Stull's rifle corps, armed with muskets, a!' 
of the same regiment, were ordered to take possession of the abrupt 
acclivity before mentioned, terminating the ravine. This was deemed a 
desirable position, because it commanded completely the ravine and th 
road crossing it, and a considerable extent of the ground over which the 
front line would necessarily retire if forced back ; but, after a short space 
of time, report was made to me that broken grounds interrupted the 
approach to it with artillery but a circuitous route that would consume 
much time, and that in case of retreat, the ground in the rear was such 
as might endanger the safety of the guns. It was mentioned, at the 
same time, that near to it was a commanding position for artillery, and 
easy of access from and to the road. I yielded with reluctance to the 
abandonment of the position first ordered, but tim.e did not admit of 
!iesitation. Meanwhile I had posted Lieutenant-Colonel Kramer, with 
his battalion of Maryland drafted militia, in the woods on the right of 
the road, and commanding the ravine which continued in that direction, 
with orders that, if forced, he should retire, by his right, through a body 
of woods in that direction, and rally and form with the troops stationed 
in the rear, on the extreme right. Upon examining the position taken 
by Major Peter's battery, it was found that the range of his guns v^^^s 
principally through that part of the field occupied by the 36th repri- 
ment. To remove one or the other became necessary, and the difficulty 
of the ground for moving artillery, and the exigency of the movement left 
no alternative. The 36th fell back about one hundred yards, losing, in 
some measure, the advantage of its elevated ground, and leaving the 
road. The position of the 1st regiment District militia, from this circum- 
stance, was also necessarily changed. It fell back about the same dis- 
tance, its riffht still resting on the road, and now formed nearly in line 
with the 36th. Of the 2d regim.ent. District militia, tvro pieces of artil- 
elry and one company of riflemen, armed with muskets, were, by direc- 
tions of General Winder, sent on to the front ; with these he flanked the 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 17 

District volunteers and militia, 1070; Lieutenant-Colonel Scott's 36th 
United States regiment, 350; Lieutenant-Colonel Kramer's battalion of 
drafted militia, 210; and Major Waring's battalion of Prince George's 
militia, about 150; total, about 1800 men. An encampment was formed 
for the night, and such positions taken as were best calculated to resisi 
a night attack; the cavalry being already stationed in advance on the 
diffei-ent roads leading to IMarlborough, with orders to keep patrolling 
parties constantly upon the enemy's quarters, and to advise of all his 
movements. The troops, being greatly fatigued, sought in sleep that 
repose they so much wanted. In this they were disappointed. An alarm 
gun aroused them about 2 o'clock in the morning of the 23d. They were 
quickly formed in the front of their encampment, and dispositions made 
to meet and repel the expected attack; but in a short time it was ascer- 
tained to be a false alarm, and the troops were dismissed, but vv'ith orders 
to hold themselves ready for tlieir posts at a moment's warning. 

At daylight, General Winder gave orders to have the tents struck and 
the bfiggage-wagons loaded, and that the whole should be ready to move 
in one hour. These orders were complied with with all possible expe- 
dition. Shortly after the troops were got under arms, and were joined 
by another small detachment of Prince George's militia, under the com- 
mand of Major INIaynard, about one hundred and fifty. The whole were 
held Yiid} tc move according to orders. About this time I received 
directions from General Vv^inder to ha\'0 formed an advance corps, con- 
structed as the one of the preceding day, and be prepared to move as his 
subsequent orders should designate. 



On Wednesday morning, the 24th of August, at 11 a. m. I received 
orders from General Winder to detach one piece of artillery and one 
company of infantry to repair to the Eastern Branch Bridge, and there 
report to Colonel Wadsworth; and to proceed v/ith tlte residue of the 
troops to Bladensburg, and take a position to support General Stansbury. 
This order was put in immediate execution, ancl the troops for Bladens- 
burg moved off with all the expedition of which they were capable. Hav- 
ing put them in motion, I passed on ahead, in order that I might select 
my position against their arrival. I found General Stansbury posted 
on tjie west side of the Eastern Branch, his right resting on the main 
road, di.stant from the bi-idge at Bladensburg five or six hundred yards. 
and extending northeastwardly, his left approaching nearer to the creek. 
An extensive apple orchard was in his front, and, one hundred to two 
hundred yards in advance, a work thrown up, comnumding the bridge, 
occupied by a corps of artillei'ists with five or six pieces, and appeared 
to be supported by some rifle and light companion.; In his rear, on the 
right was a thick undergrowth of wood, and directly behind that a deep 
hollow, or.xavine, -open or- cleared, of about sixty yaj'ds in width-,- which 
the main road crosses. The ravine terminates on the left m a bold accliv- 
itv, about two hundred yai-ds^ from the i-oad ; the rest of the ground in 
his lear was open, unbroken, and gradually ascending fields. Having 
hastily examined the grounds, and concluded on the dispositions I should 



_ BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 1^ 

extreme left of the front line ; two pieces more of artillery were posted 
in the road near the bridge at Bladensbiirg; the residue of that regiment, 
about three hundred and fifty strong, under the conmiand of Colonel 
Brent, was formed as a reserve a short distance in the rear of Major 
Peter's battery, and so disposed as to act on the right, or left, or in front, 
as occasion might require. Near them was posted, in the same maimer. 
Major Waring's Prince George's battalion of militia, about one hundred 
and fifty. Colonel William D. Beall, with a regiment of troops from 
Annapolis, passed through Bladensburg as our troops arrived, and took 
a position on the right of the road and nearly fronting it, at a distance 
of about two hundred and fifty yards. Previous to the arrival of the 
troops on the ground. General Winder came up from the city, and, being 
made acquainted with the intended dispositions of the troops, as well ao 
the ground reserved for Commodore Barney and the rnarinci, approved 
of and confirmed them. 

About half past twelve o'clock, and while the troops were yet taking 
their different positions, innumerable rockets, thrown from the heights 
at Bladensburg, announced the arrival of the enemy there; and at this 
period Commodore Barney's sailors and marines, in quick march, arrived 
and took possession of the ground previously assigned them, his artillery 
being posted in and near the road upon its right, commanding the road 
and open field in front; and his infantry, together Vvith the marines 
under Captain Miller, extending to the right, thus occupying the interval 
of ground between Colonel Magruder's 1st regiment District militia and 
Colonel Beall's Maryland regiment. The firing of artillery m front soo:i 
commenced, and immediately after that of musketry, in quick and rapid 
succession. In a few minutes the whole right and centre of the front line, 
with some small exceptions, were seen retiring, in disorder and confusion. 
The firing still continued on the extreme left, but shortly after it also 
broke, and, although it retired in more order, yet none could be rallied 
so as to renew the action with effect, and also soon entirely quitted the 
field. 

Meanwhile the left of the enemy, in heavy column, passed along the 
road crossing the ravine. They were here encountered by the troops oi 
Colonel Kramer, posted in the woods on the edge of the ravine. These, 
after a short conflict, were compelled to retire, which they did princi- 
pally under cover of the adjacent woods, and formed with the troops of 
Colonel Beall on the right. The enemy's column now displayed in the 
field on the right of the road. They here became exposed to the oblique 
fire of Major Peter's battery, which was kept up with great animation. 
Still pressing on to the front of our right, they came in contact v/ith the 
heavy artillery of Commodore Barney, and of the troops posted there. 
Here the firing became tremendous. They were repulsed, again returiiod 
to the charge, succeeded in forcing the troops on the right, and finally 
carried the position of Commodore Barney. 

The dispersion of the front line caused a dangerous opeTiing on our 
left, of which the enemy in that quarter promptly availed. He advanced 
rapidly; then, wheeling on his left, soon gained, and was turning our 
left flank. To oppose this alarming movement, I directed Colonel Brent, 
with the 2d regiment of District militia, to take a position still more to 



20 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



the left; and he was proceeding in the execution of this order when 
orders came from General Winder for the whole of the troops to retreat. 
The efforts of the enemy had hitherto been directed principally against 
the right and left of our whole line of battle. 

The troops of this District, and a part of those attached to them, 
occupying positions mostly in the centre, and some of them difhcult of 
access, were conseQuently but partially engaged, and this principally 
with light troops and skirmishers, now pressing forward, supported by 
a column of infantry. 



The order to retreat was executed by regiments and corps, as they 
had been formed, and with as much order as the nature of the ground 
would permit. The first and second regiments halted and formed, after 
retreating five or six hundred paces, but were again ordered by General 
Winder to retire. At this moment I fell in with General Winder, and, 
after a short conference with him, was directed to move on and collect 
the troops, and prepare to make a stand on the heights westward of the 
turn pike gate. I'his was done as fast as the troops came up. A front 
was again presented toward the enemy, consisting principally of the 
troops of this district, a part of those who had been attached to them 
in the action, and a Virginia regiment of about four hundred men, un- 
der (Jol.'Tu-r Minor, which met us at this place. While *-.he line was yet 
i'orniin^:. I re.jeived orders frca General \Vi:id^r to i'ull back to the Capi- 
tol, and tiiere form for battle. 1 took, the lil.c^ity of suggesting my im- 
pression of the preferable situation we then occupied; but, expecting that 
he might be joined there by some of the diJrporsed troops of the front 
line, he chose to make the stand there. Approaching the Capitol, I halt- 
ed the troops, and lequested his orders as to the formation of the line. 
We found no auxiliaries there. He then conferred for a few ir.oments 
with General Armstrong, who was £■ short distance from us, and then 
gave orders that the whole should retreat through Washmgion ana 
Georgetown. It is impossible to do justice to the anguish evinced by the 
troops of Washington and Georgetown on the receiving of this order, 
.'he idea of leaving their families, their houses, and their homes at the 
mercy of an enraged enemy was insupportable. To preserve that order 
which was maintained during the retreat was now no longer practicable. 
As they retired through Washington and Georgetown, numbers were ob- 
taining and taking lea\'e to visit their homes, and then again rojoininj),"; 
and with ranks thus broken and scattered, they halted at night on the 
heights near Tenleytown, and on the ensuing assemble at Montgomery 
Court House. 

The troops of Washing-ton and Georgetown have been assailed, in 
the public prints and elsewhere, with calumnies as unmei-itcd as they 
are cruel and wanton. They have heard of them with indignant as- 
tonishment. Con.scious that in no instance have they been wanting in 
the duty they owed to their country or to themselves, but, on the con- 
trary, in obedience to the call of their government, have with alaci-ity 
obeyed its orders, and inti-epidly fronted an enemy vastly their superior 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 21 



in force, and never yielded the ground to him but by orders emanating 
from superior authority, they can not restrain the feelings excited by 
such manifest, such unprovoked injustice. They have seen with satisfac- 
tion the resolution of Congress to inquire into this subject, and, persuad- 
ed of the justice and impartiality of your honorable committee, enter- 
tain a confident assurance that the result of your investigation will af- 
ford relief to their injured feelings. Connected with this subject, I beg 
leave to refer to a letter of General Winder, No. 3, in answer to an in- 
quiry made of him as to the general conduct of the brigade while unuci. 
his command. 

I have the honor to be, etc., 

W. SMITH, 



Brigadier-General 1st Columbia Brigade. 



Honorable R. M. Johnson. 



P. S. — I ought to have mentioned that parts of two companies of 
the United States 12th and 38th regiments were attached to the 36th 
regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Scott. Previous to the march to 
Bladensburg, eighty men of his command had been stationed near the 
Eastern Branch Bridge, and did not join until after the action. His 
force then was less than three hundred men. — W. S. 



P.EPORT OF COMMODORE BARNEY IN MILITARY AND NAVAL 

LETTERS. 

About 2 o'clock General Winder came to my quarters, and we made 
some arrangements for the morning. In the morning I received a note 
from General Winder, and waited upon him ; he requested me to take 
command, and place my artillery to defend the passage of the bridge on 
the Eastern Branch, as the enemy was approaching the city in that di- 
rection. I immediately put my guns into position, leaving the marines 
and the rest of my men at the barracks, to wait further orders. I was 
in this situation when I had the honour to meet you, with the President 
and heads of departments, when it was determined that I should draw 
off my guns and men, and proceed towards Bladensburg, which v\^as im- 
mediately put into execution. On our way, I was informed that the en- 
emy was within a mile of Bladensburg; — we hurried on. The day was 
hot, and my men very much crippled from the severe marches we had 
experienced the days before, many of them being without shoes, which 
I had replaced that morning, I preceded the men, and when I arrived 
at the li7ie which separates the district from Maryland, the battle began. 
I sent an oflicer back to hurry on my men; they came up in a trot; we 
took our position on the rising ground, put the pieces in battery, posted 
the marines under Captain Millej-, and the flotilla men, who were to act 
as infantry, under their own officers, on my right, to support the pieces, 
and waited the approach of the enemy. During this period the engage- 



22 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



ment continued, and the enemy advancing, our own army retreating 
before them, apparently in much disorder. At length the enemy made 
his appearance on the main road, in force, and in front of my battery, 
and on seeing us made a halt. 1 reserved our lire. In a few minutes the 
enemy again advanced, when I ordered an 18 pounder to be fired, which 
completely cleared the road; shortly aiter, a second and a third attempt 
was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They 
then crossed over into an open field, and atitniptcd to flank our right; 
he was there met by three 12 pounders, the marines under Captain ]\Iil- 
ler, and my men, acting as infantry, and was again totally cut up. By 
this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body 
five or six hundred, posted on a height on my right, from whom 1 expect- < 
ed nuich support, from their fine situation. 

The enemy from this period never appeared in force in front of us; 
they pushed forv/ard their sharp shooters; one of which shot my horse 
under me, who fell dead between two of my guns. The enemy, who had 
been kept in check by our fire for nearly half an hour, novv began to out- 
flank us on the right; our guns were turned that way; he pushed up the 
hill, about two or three hundred, towards the corps of Americans sta- 
tioned as above described, who, to my great mortification, made no re- 
sistance, giving a fire or two and retired. In this situation Vv^e had the 
whole army of the enemy to contend with. Our ammunition was ex- 
pended; and, unfortunately, the drivers of my ammunition wagons had 
gone oft" in the general panic. At this time 1 received a severe wound in 
my thigh; Captain Miller was wounded; sailing master Warner killed; 
acting sailing master IMartin killed; and^sailino- master Martin wounded; 
but, to the honor of my ofticers and men, as fast as their companions and 
►messmates fell at the guns, they ware instantly replaced from the 
infantry. 

Finding the enemy now" completely in our rear, and no means of de- 
fense, I gave orders to my officers and men to retire. 

• « « * 



REPORT OF ADMIRAL COCKBURN. 

At day-light, on the morning of the 24th, the major-general again put 
the army in motion, directing his march upon Bladensburg; on reaching 
which place, with the advanced brigade, the enemy was observed drawn 
up in force on a rising grourxd beyond the town; and by the fire he soon 
opened on us as we ent' i-ed the pi;ve tc.ivo us to iiiidcrsiand he was well 
]3rotected by artillery. General Ross, however, did not hesitate in imme- 
diately advancing to attack him, although our troops were almost exhaust- 
ed with the fatigue of the march they had just made, and but a small 
proportion of our little army had yet got up. This dashing measure was, 
howcvei", I am hapi)y to add, crowned with the success it merited ; for, 
in spite of the galling fire of the enemy, our troops advanced steadily 
on both his fianks, and in his front; and, as soon as they Arrived on even 
ground with him, he fled in every direction, leaving behind him 10 pieces 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURO 2:J 

of cannon, and a considerable number of killed and wounded; amongst 
the latter Commodore Barney, and several other ofiicers. Some other 
prisoners were also taken, though not many, owing to the swiftness with 
which the enemy went off, and the fatigue our army had previously 
undergone. 

It would, sir, be deemed presumption in me to attempt lo give you 
particular details respecting the nature of this battle; I shall, therefore, 
only remark generally, that the enemy, 8,000 strong, on ground he haa 
chosen as best adapted for him to defend, where he had time to erect his 
batt(n-ies, and concert all his measures, was dislodged as soon as reached, 
and a victory gained over him by a division of^ the British army, not 
amounting to more than 1500 men, headed by our gallant general, whoso 
brilliant achievements of this day it is beyond my power to do justice to, 
and indeed no possible comment could enhance. 



REPORT OF MAJOR GENERAL ROSS. 
. . TONNANT, IN THE PaTUxENT, 

August 30, 1814. 

My Lord, 

1 have the honor to communicate to your lordship, that on the 2411 
instant, after defeating the army of 'the United States on that day, the 
troops under my command entered and took possession of the city of 
Washington. 

It was determined between Sir Alexander Cochrane and myself, to 
disembark the army at the village of Benedict, on the right bank of ih-j 
Patuxent, with the intention of cooperating with Rear-Adiniral Ccc'. 
burn, in an attack upon a flotilla of the enemy's gun-boats, under tlio 
command of Commodore Barney. On the 20th instant, the army com- 
menced its march, having landed the previous day VNithout opposition; 
on the 21st it reached Nottingham, and on the 22d moved on to Upper 
Marlborough, a few miles distant from Pig Point, on the Patuxent, v.heis 
Admiral Cockburn fell in with and defeated the flotilla, taking and de- 
stroying the whole. Having advanced within 16 miles of Washington, 
and ascertained the force of the enemy to be such as might authorize aii 
attempt at carrying his capitol, I determined to make it, and accordingly 
put the troops in movement on the evening of the 23rd. A corps of about 
1200 men appeared to oppose us, but retired after firing a few shots. On 
the 24th the troops resumed their march and reached Bladen^-jurg, r. 
village situate on the left bank of the eastern branch of the Potomac, 
about five miles from Washington. 

On the opposite side of that river the enemy was discovered strongly 
posted on very commanding heights, formed in two lines, his advance 
occupying a fortified houf.e \^hich, tvith artillery, covered the bridge 
over the eastern branch, which the British had to pass. A broad and 



24 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



straight road leading from the bridge to Washington, i-an through the 
enemy's position, which was careluliy defended by artillery and rifle- 
men. 

The disposition for the attack being made, it was commenced with 
so much impetuosity by the light brigade, consisting of the 85th light 
infantry and the light infantry companies of the army under the com- 
mand of Colonel Thornton, that the fortified house was shortly carried, 
tlie enemy retiring to the higher grounds. 

In support of the light brigade, I ordered up a brigade under the 
command of Colonel Brooke, w^ho, with the 44th regiment, attacked the 
enemy's left, the 4th regiment pressing his right with such effect as to 
cause him to abandon his guns. His first line giving way, was driven 
on the second, w'hich, yielding to the irresistable attack of the bayonet, 
and the well-directed discharge of rockets, got into confusion and fled, 
leaving the British masters of the field. The rapid flight of the enemy, 
and his knowledge of the country, precluded the possibility of many 
pris( ners being taken, more particularly as the troops had, during the 
day,' undergone considerable fatigue. 

The enemy's army, amounting to 8000 or 9000 men, with 300 or 
400 cavalry, was under the command of General Winder, being formed 
of troops drawn from Baltimore and Pennsylvania. His artillery, ten 
pieces of which fell into our hands, was commanded by Commodore Bar- 
ney, who was wounded and taken prisoner. The artillery I directed to 
be destroyed. 

Having halted the army for a short time, I determined to march 
upon Washington, and reached that city at 8 o'clock that night. Judging 
it of consequence to complete the destruction of the public buildings 
with the least possible delay, so that the army might retire without loss 
of time, the following buildings were set fire to and consumed — the capi- 
tol, including the Senate-house and House of Representatives; the Ar- 
senal, the Dock-yard, Treasury, War Office, President's Palace, Ropewalk 
and the great bridge across the Potomac; in the Dock-yard a frigate 
nearly ready to be launched, and a sloop of war, were consumed. The 
two bridges leading to Washington over the eastern branch had been 
destroyed by the enemy, who apprehended an attack from that quarter. 
The object of the expedition being accomplished, I determined, before 
any greater force of the enemy could be assembled, to withdraw the 
troops, and accordingly commenced retiring on the night of the 25th. 
On the evening of the 29th we reached Benedict, and re-embarked the 
following day. In the performance of the operation I have detailed it 
is with the utmost satisfaction I observe to your lordship that cheerful- 
ness in undergoing fatigue, the anxiety for the accomplishment of the 
object, wei'c conspicuous in all ranks. 



LETTER OF A BRITISH OFFICER IN MILITARY OCCURRENCES. 

* * * on turning a sudden angle in the road, and passing a small 
plantation, which obstructed the vision tow^ards the left, the British and 
American armies became visible to one another. The position occupied 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 25 

by the latter was one of great strength and commanding attitude. They 
were drawn up in three lines upon the brow of a hill, having their Iront 
and left flank covered by a branch of the Potomac, and their right rest- 
ing upon a thick wood and a deep ravine. This river, which may be 
about the breadth of the Isis at Oxford, flowed between the heights occu- 
pied by the American forces and the little town of Bladensbui'g. Across 
it was thi'own a narrow bridge, extending from the chief street in that 
town to the continuation of the road, which passed through the very 
center of their position ; and its right bank (the bank above which they 
were drawn up) was covered with a narrow strip of willows and larch 
trees, whilst the left was altogether bare, low and exposed. Such was 
the general aspect of their position as at the first glance it presented 
itself; of which I must endeavor to give a more detailed account, that 
my description of the battle may be in some degree intelligible. 

I have said that the right bank of the Potomac was covered with 
a narrow strip of willow and larch tree^;. Here the Americans had sta- 
■ tioned strong bodies of riflemen, who, in skirmishing order, covered the 
whole front of their army. Behind this narrow plantation, again, the 
fields were open and clear, intersected, at certain distances, by rows of 
high and strong palings. About the middle of the ascent, and in the 
rear of these row^s, stood the first line, composed entirely of infantry ; 
at a proper interval from this, and in a similai- situation, stood the sec- 
ond line ; while the third, or reserve, was posted within the skirts of a 
wood, which crowned the heights. The artillery, again, of which they 
had twenty pieces in the field, was thus arranged : On the high road, and 
commanding the bridge, stood two heavy guns ; and four more, two on 
each side of the road, swept partly in the same direction, and partly 
down the whole of the slope into the streets of Bladensburg. The rest 
were scattered, with no great judgment, along the second line of infan- 
try, occupying different spaces between the right of one regiment and 
the left of another; while the cavalry showed itself in one mass, within 
a stubble field, near the extreme left of the position. Such was the nature 
of the ground which they occupied, and the formidable posture in which 
they waited our approach ; amounting, by their own account, to COOO 
men, a number exactly doubling that of the force which was to attack 
them. 

In the meantime, our column continued to advance in the same order 
which it had hitherto preserved. The road conducted us for about two 
miles in a direction parallel with the river, and of consequence with the 
enemy's line ; when it suddenly turned, and led directly towards the town 
of Bladensburg. Being, of course, ignorant whether this town might not 
be filled with American troops, the main body paused here, till the ad- 
vance guard should reconnoitre. The result proved that no opposition 
was intended in that quarter, and that the whole of the enemy's army 
had been withdrawn to the opposite side of the stream, whereupon the 
army was again put in motion, and in a short time arrived in the streets 
of Bladensburg, and within range of the American artillery. Immedi- 
ately on our reaching this point, several of their guns opened upon us, 
j.nd kept up a quick and well directed cannonade, from which, as we were 
again commanded to halt, the men were directed to shelter themselves as 



26 BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 

much as possible behind the houses. The object of this halt, it was con- 
jectured, was to give the General an opportunity of examining the Amer- 
ican line, and of trying the depth of the river; because at present there 
appeared to be but one practicable mode of attack, by crossing the 
bridge, and taking the enemy directly in front. To do so, however, ex- 
posed as the bridge was, must be attended with bloody consequence, nor 
could the delay of a few minutes produce any mischief which the discov- 
ery of a ford would not amply compensate. 

But in this conjecture we were altogether mistaken; for without 
allowing time to the column to close its ranks or to be formed by some or 
the many stragglers, who were now hurrying, as fast as wearmess would 
permit, to regain their places, the order to halt was countermanded, and 
the word given to attack, and we immediately pushed on at double quick 
time, towards the head of the bridge. While we were moving along the 
street, a continued fire was kept up, with some execution, from those 
guns which stood to the left of the road; but it was not till the bridge 
was covered with our people that the two-gun battery upon the road itself 
began to play. Then, indeed, it also opened, and with tremendous effect, 
for at the first discharge almost an entire company was swept down: 
but whether it was that the guns had been previously laid with measured 
e^iactness, or that the nerves of the gunners became afterwards unsteady, 
the succeeding discharges were much less fatal. The riflemen likewise 
now galled us from the wooded bank with a running fire of musketry, 
and it was not without trampling upon many of their dead and dying 
comrades that the light brigade established itself on the opposite side of 
the stream. 

When once there, however, everything else appeared easy. Wheel- 
ing off to the right and left of the road, they dashed into the thicket and 
quickly cleared it of the American skirmishers, who, falling back with 
pi-ecipitation upon the first line, threw it into disorder before it had fired 
a shot. The consequence was that our troops had scarcely shown their 
selves when the whole of that line gave way and fled in the greatest con- 
fusion, leaving the two guns upon the road in possession of the victors. 
But here it must be confessed that the light brigade was guilty of 
imprudence. Instead of pausing till the rest of the army came up, thoy 
lightened themselves by throwing away their knapsacks and haversacks, 
and, extending their rank so as to show an equal front with the enemy, 
pushed on to the attack of the second line. The Americans, however, 
saw their v/eaknoss and stood firm, and, having the whole of their artil- 
lery, with the exception of those captured on the road, and the greater 
part of their infa-itry in this line, they first checked the ardour of the 
assailants by a heavy fire, and then in their turn, advanced to recover 
the ground which was lost. Against this charge the extended order of 
the British troops would not permit them to ofl'er an effectual resistance, 
and they were accordingly borne back to the very thicket upon the river's 
bi'ink, where thoy maintained themselves with determined obstinacy, re- 
pelling all attempts to drive them through it, and frequently following, 
to within a short distance of the cannon's mouth, such parts of the en- 
emy's line as gave way. 

In this state the action continued till the second brigade had likewise 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 27 



crossed and formed upon the right bank of the river, when the /I4th Reg- 
iment moving to the right and driving in the skirmishers, debouched upon 
the left flank of the Americans, and completely turned it. In that quar- 
ter, therefore, the battle was won, because the rav/ militia-men, who 
were stationed there as being the least assailable point, when once broken 
could not bo. rallied. But on their right, the enemy still kept their ground 
with much ]-esolution ; nor was it until the arrival of the 4th Regiment 
and the advance of the Briti.sh forces in firm array to the charge, that 
they began to waver. Then, indeed, seeing their left in full flight, and 
the 44th getting in their rear, they lost all order and dispersed, leaving 
clouds of riflemen to cover their retreat, and hastened to conceal them- 
selves in the woods, whorv it would have been vain to follow them. The 
rout v/as now general througliout the whole line. The reserve, which 
ought to have supported the main body, fled as soon as those in its front 
began to give away; and the cavalry, instead of charging the British 
troops, now scattered in pursuit, turned their horses' heads and gallop- 
ed ofl", leaving them in undisputed possession of the field, and of ten 
out of the twenty pieces of art:';.ery. 

This battle, by which the fate of the American capitol was decided, 
began about one o'clock in the afternoon and lasted till four. The loss 
on the part of the English was severe, since, out of the two-thirds of the 
army, which were engaged, upwards of five hundred men v/ere killed 
and wounded; and what rendered it doubly severe was, that among 

these were numbered several oflicers of rank and distinction On 

the side of the Americans the slaughter was not so great. Being in pos- 
session of a strong position, they were of course less exposed in defend- 
ing, than the others in storming it; and had they conducted themselves 
with coolness, and resolution, it is not conceivable how the day could 
have been won. But the fact is, that with the exception of a party of 
sailors from the gun boats, under the command of Commodore Barney, 
no troops could be'^nv^ wor;o thnii they did. The sliirmishers v/ere di'iv- 
en in as soon as attacked, the first line gave way without oflferiiTg* the 
slightest resistance, and the left of the main body was broken within 
half an hour after it was seriously engaged. Of the sailors, however, 
it would be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct 
merits. They were employed as gunners, and not only did they serve 
their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished their as- 
sailants, but they stood until some of them were actually bayoneted, with 
fusees in their hands; nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken, 
and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they 
(luitted the field. With respect to the British army, again, no line of dis- 
tinction can be drawn. All did their duty, and none more gallantly 
than the rest; and though the brunt of the afl'air fell on the light bri- 
gade, this was owing chiefly to the circumstances of its being at the 
head of the column, and perhai^s, also, in some degree, to its own rash 
impetuousity. The artillery, indeed, could do little ; being unable to show 
itself in presence of a force so superior; but the six-pounder was never- 
theless brought into action, and a corps of rockets proved of striking 
utility. 

Our troops being worn down from fatigue, and of course as ignorant 



28 



BATTLE OF BLADENSBURG 



of the country, as the Americans were the reverse, the pursuit could not 
be continued to any distance. Neither was it attended with much slaught^ 
er. Diving into the recesses of the forests, and covering themselves with 
riflemen, the enemy wei'e quickly beyond our reach; and having no cav- 
aliy to scour even the high road, ten of the lightest of their guns were 
carried off in the flight. The defeat, however, was absolute, and the army, 
uiiich had been collected for the defence of Washington was scattered 
beyond the possibility of, at least, an immediate reunion ; and as the 
distance from Bladensburg to that city does not exceed four miles, there 
appeared to be no further obstacle in the way, to prevent its immediate 
capture. 






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LIBRfiRY OF CONGRESS 

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